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Abstract
We give a Kripke-style semantics for the intuitionistic logic of pragmatics ILP and show completeness with respect
to this semantics. In order to prove the completeness theorem we give a decision procedure that given an ILP-
sequent , either returns a cut-free derivation of or constructs a finite counter-model if is not provable. Thus we
have the finite model property and also a new proof that the cut rule is eliminable in ILP.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Principles of the logic of pragmatics
1.1.1 The philosophical context
The project of a formal pragmatics, introduced by Dalla Pozza and Garola [6], arises in
philosophical logic and aims at resolving the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic
by presenting the latter as an extension or integration of the former, rather than an alternative
to it. Dalla Pozza and Garola take off from Frege’s distinction between propositions and
judgements: the former are entities which can be true or false; the latter are acts which have
a propositional content but are justified or unjustified (in given contexts) rather than true or
false. In Frege’s notation [8], a judgement expresses the act of asserting that is true,
while a proposition expresses the content of the act of assertion. Frege noticed that as a
consequence
1. there can be no nested occurrences of , and
2. truth-functional connectives don’t apply to expressions of judgements.
But what counts as a justification of an act of judgement ? If is a nonmathematical
sentence then is justified by some kind of evidence that is true. If is a mathematical
sentence then is justified by a proof that is true. Furthermore, a necessary and sufficient
condition to infer an assertion from an assertion is that there exists a method which
transforms a proof [evidence] of into a proof [evidence] of . The existence of such a
method justifies the implication , which is therefore intuitionistic implication.
From these considerations Dalla Pozza and Garola argue that intuitionistic logic, as a logic of
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judgements, has a different subject matter from classical logic, as the logic of propositions.
Why is the specific content of intuitionistic logic characterized as formal pragmatics? The
operation by which a proposition is transformed into an act of assertion may be regarded as an
illocutionary operator in the sense of Austin [1]; by the above considerations, intuitionistic
logic is about the logical properties of such an operator. In [5] the framework has been
extended to a logic of judgements and norms: here the act setting the obligation to bring about
(the state of affairs described by the proposition) is expressed by ; the resulting formal
system may be regarded as an axiomatization of the logical properties of the illocutionary
operator of obligation.
It could be objected that every act of assertion or of obligation is performed by a subject
in a given state of information and situation; indeed one of the main functions of pragmatics
in linguistic theory is to fix the context for a semantic interpretation of an expression. In
general norms are valid within a normative system : this dependance could be expressed
by the notation . Although a fully developed formal pragmatics should characterize
the properties of relativized judgements and obligations, it is legitimate to develop first a
theory of the properties of the operators which hold abstracting from particular subjects and
situations: in particular expresses an impersonal act of judgement and expresses a
norm which is valid in every rational normative system.
A more subtle issue can be raised about the status of molecular formulas and pragmatic
connectives. If and express an illocutionary act, does the conjunction
express a composite act or a relation between acts? The paper [6] does not answer this
question; however, since a relation between acts may be regarded as a binary function which
returns a truth-value, the interpretation of molecular expressions as acts seems inescapable.
We cannot further discuss the issue here.
Therefore in [6, 5] the language of formal pragmatics and its semantics are as follows:
1. Radical formulas are of the form
where ranges over an infinite set of propositional letters and , , and are the usual
classical connectives; radical formulas are interpreted according to Tarski’s semantics.
2. Elementary formulas are of the form
where and are signs of illocutionary force and the symbol stands for an illocution-
ary act which is never justified.
3. Sentential formulas are of the form
where , and are the pragmatic connectives interpreted according to Heyting’s se-
mantics of proofs.
What are the relations between the different layers of the formal system for pragmatics? How
does one prove that an intuitionistic pragmatics is compatible with classical semantics? A
partial answer is given by Go¨del [9], McKinsey and Tarski’s [14] interpretation of intuition-
istic logic into the classical modal system S4 in [6]. Namely, one extends the radical part of
the language with the following grammar:
which is interpreted by Kripke’s semantics for S4 (on preordered frames). Then one sets the
modal translation of the sentential formulas as follows:
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When the elementary formulas include an operator of obligation [5], then the radical part
is also extended with a modal operator ‘ ’, which is given Kripke’s semantics for KD (on
frames without terminal points). As the deontic expression belongs to an intuitionistic
sentential language, the modal translation must be as follows:
According to [5], the modal interpretation of the elementary formulas establishes a relation
between the expressive use and the descriptive use of the operators of illocutionary force and
thus of the whole pragmatic language: a Tarskian semantics can be assigned to the pragmatic
language only in its descriptive use, not in its expressive use. The existence of a correspon-
dence between the expressive use and the descriptive use of the pragmatic language does not
justify the claim that the latter fully represents the former; in particular it does not rule out
the possibility that the expressive use may be more adequately represented by other mathe-
matical constructions (such as computational, categorical, game-theoretical interpretations of
intuitionistic logic) and that Kripke’s semantics may be a kind of abstract interpretation of
the whole pragmatic system.
The intuitionistic fragment of the language is obtained by restricting the class of ele-
mentary formulas to those with atomic radical only. In addition to the projection of the whole
pragmatic system down to the semantic level, given by the modal interpretation, one would
also expect an inverse action of the semantic level on the pragmatic level, which would cer-
tainly provide a stronger case for the compatibility claim by Dalla Pozza and Garola. Some
indications for this line of research are in [6, 5], but we will not consider them here and limit
ourselves to the intuitionistic fragment.
1.1.2 The pragmatic system as a framework for AI
In [2] the system of formal pragmatics has been given a Gentzen-style sequent calculus pre-
sentation and also developed to provide a mathematically principled approach to Artificial
Intelligence applications.
Consider the problem of axiomatizing the foundations of laws, or more generally, of rep-
resenting legal reasoning within a normative system. A sequent calculus for intuitionistic
logic extended with an intuitionistic deontic modality would not suffice to formalize actual
normative systems. For instance, according to Kelsen’s theory [11] a typical norm occurring
in a normative system could be formalized by an axiom 1
where represents an illicit act and an appropriate sanction. The axiom expresses the
obligation for a judge to inflict the sanction in case conclusive evidence has been gathered
that the illicit act has been performed.
1The formalization would perhaps be more faithful to Kelsen’s theory, the obligation being
adressed only to the judge.
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The example shows that, first, in order to deal with normative systems we need a proof
system for mixed assertive and prescriptive illocutionary forces and, second, one that could
express nontrivial relations between norms and assertions. For instance, we would like to
express the principle that if is a consequence of , then the prohibition of entails
the prohibition of .
But for which notion of consequence does such a principle hold? As is argued in [2], only
a causal relation validates it. Indeed, the axioms
are counterintuitive if we consider for example ‘Hitler is dead’ and ‘The Titanic
has sunk’. On the other hand, writing c for causal implication, consider the axioms
c
c
where the sentence is ‘The gun is shot’ and is ‘The person is killed’. These axioms
become plausible if the method trasforming a justification of into a justification is
a causal relation.
A formalization of the connective of causal implication is itself a difficult and controversial
issue, let alone the production of a mixed system involving causality. The only possible
choice at this stage was to axiomatize some features of causal implication, as they result
from an analysis of very specific uses, namely, extensionality and relevance. According to
the interpretation in [2], c is justified if and only if there is a scientific law
such that and for some term . This interpretation
doesn’t support the use of weakening. Furthermore this interpretation is extensional, i.e. the
correctness of c depends only on the existence of a scientific law
and the justification of where and . In this strictly extensional
interpretation we don’t fully understand what is means to say that c c
and thus causal implication has its intended meaning only in positive occurrences. Thus we
consider only formulas in which the occurrences of causal implication are of the form
c c c
Futhermore we suppose that the interpretation is symmetric, i.e. if denotes interderivability
then
c c c c
The paper [2] presents a mixed relevant and intuitionistic sequent calculus ILP for the
intuitionistic fragment of the pragmatic system with operators for assertion, obligation and
causal implication and gives a syntactic proof of consistency of the system, as a corollary of
the cut-elimination theorem.
Adding the pragmatic connective of causal implication to the language raises several
issues. Is there a distinction between expressive and descriptive use of causal implication?
Can we say that c expresses a different act from , depending on
whether the method leading from a justification of to the justification of is causal
or not? What Kripke semantics shall we assign to the descriptive use of causal implication?
We cannot discuss these philosophical issues here. To interpret causal implication we shall
choose the monoidal semantics for relevant implication originally due to Urquhart [17], but
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we are aware that this choice is not the only one possible. Such a choice has the consequence
of bringing the mixed system for formal pragmatics close to mixed systems for intuitionistic
and linear implication, such as Girard’s LU [10] and Pym and O’Hearn’s BI [15] (perhaps
closer to the former than to the latter). The restrictions on the uses of causal implication
clearly makes our system a very small fragment of such general mixed systems. For this
reason and others, comparing our approach with theirs is clearly beyond the scope of this
paper.
1.2 Basic ideas of the present work
The aim of this paper is to give a Kripke-style semantics to the sequent calculus ILP which
formalizes the principles of the intuitionistic logic of pragmatics explained above.
As explained above, the Kripke-style semantics is not given to the pragmatic operators of
in their expressive use, but to their descriptive counterpart. Thus with respect to the pre-
sentation in [2] we extend the radical formulas at the semantic level with the new connectives
for the S4modality, for theKDmodality, for relevant implication and for absurdity.
As already suggested in [13] for intuitionistic logic the completeness of the intuitionistic
logic of pragmatics is obtained by the completeness of the interpreted formulas with respect
to the given Kripke-style semantics and by the existence of the interpretation.
In order to show the completeness theorem we give a proof-search procedure and a proce-
dure that constructs finite counter-models if the sequent is not provable. For the proof-search
procedure we consider only proofs in particular form, called canonical proofs: the advantage
of canonical proofs is that we can use one of the well known proof-search procedures for in-
tuitionistic propositional logic which must only be extended to deal with the connectives for
assertability, obligation and causal implication. Also the procedure that constructs counter-
models for unprovable sequents extends procedures for intuitionistic propositional logic. As
a consequence of this the finite model property follows from the finiteness of the counter-
models for propositional intuitionistic logic. From the fact that the proof-search procedure
considers only canonical proofs, which are in particular cut-free proofs, it follows that we
can give a new proof of cut elimination.
The paper is structured in the following way. In Section 2 we introduce the pragmatic
language and the sequent calculus ILP given in [2]. Furthermore, we extend the radical
part of the language and define an interpretation of sentential formulas in the extended radical
part. Then, in Section 3 we define the Kripke-style semantics for the formulas of the extended
radical part which is based on the Kripke semantics of modal [12, 3] and relevant logic [17].
Furthermore, we show the soundness theorem. Finally, in Section 4 we give a proof-search
procedure with respect to proofs in canonical form and a procedure to construct counter-
models. In this way we show the completeness theorem, decidability of ILP, finite model
property and cut elimination.
2 Intuitionistic logic of pragmatics
2.1 Pragmatic language
DEFINITION 2.1 (pragmatic language)
The formulas of the pragmatic language are defined inductively by the following rules.
1. Radical formulas are of the form
Page 759   Journal of Logic and Computation
 at University of Verona on November 16, 2012
http://logcom.oxfordjournals.org/
Downloaded from 
760 A Kripke-style Semantics for the Intuitionistic Logic of Pragmatics ILP
c
FIGURE 1. Extended modal interpretation
where ranges over an infinite set of propositional letters and , , and are the
usual classical connectives.
2. Elementary formulas are of the form
and
where and are signs of illocutionary force and the symbol stands for an illocution-
ary act which is never justified.
3. Sentential formulas are of the form
c and
where the symbol c stands for causal implication and , and are the pragmatic
connectives.
The intuitionistic fragment of the language is obtained by restricting the class of elemen-
tary formulas to those with atomic radical only.
We consider an extended version of the pragmatic language in which we extend the
radical part of the language with the modal operators and , the connective and the
logical constant . In order to model relevant logic we need also the connective and the
logical constant 1 where and 1 stand for tensor product and identity of the tensor product,
respectively. Thus the radical formulas of which are denoted with are of the following
form.
1
We project the formulas of the intuitionistic fragment of the pragmatic language into
the extended radical part of the extended pragmatic language as represented in Figure 1.
This extends the Go¨del [9], McKinsey and Tarski [14] modal interpretation of intuitionistic
propositional logic with the KD modality for norms and the relevant implication for
causality.
2.2 Sequent calculus
The sequent calculus ILP formalizes derivations of sentential formulas of the intuitionistic
fragment of the pragmatic language . Let and denote finite multisets of sentential
formulas. We write Z for the nonempty multiset , A for the nonempty multiset
and A for the nonempty multiset . The rules of the sequent
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Identity rules
Structural rules
Logical rules
c
c
c
c
Mixed rules
A Z
c
A Z
FIGURE 2. The sequent calculus ILP
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calulus ILP are given in Figure 2 (where ). Note that the antecedent of the sequents
has two areas, the relevant area on the left and the pragmatic area on the right of the semi-
colon. As a consequence of this there are only positive occurrences of causal implications
and causal implications are not derivable from an absurdity.
We specify now briefly some useful properties of the sequent calculus ILP which repre-
sents the basic ideas underlying the decision procedure given in Section 4.1. Note that we
consider the proof of a sequent as a tree where the sequents form the nodes and
the instances of rules induce the edges between the nodes. Furthermore, we suppose that the
final sequent of the proof is the root of the tree.
LEMMA 2.2
A sequent is provable without cuts in ILP if and only if there exists a proof of it
such that all occurrences of the c rule have as left premiss an instance of the logical axiom
.
PROOF. Note that in the left subtree there can occur only instances of c or rules. Suppose
that the left premiss of an c rule is the conclusion of an c rule. We can permute the
order of the rules in the following way.
c
c c
c
c c
If we measure the weight of an c rule by the number of nodes in the left subtree then the
permutation decreases the weight of the rule. The same argument holds if the left premiss of
an c rule is the conclusion of an rule. Thus we can show the hypothesis by induction
on the weight of an c rule.
DEFINITION 2.3 (quasi-canonical proof)
We say that a cut-free proof is in quasi-canonical form if every path from the leaves to the
root can be split into three subpaths such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. The first subpath is induced only by instances of the , c , c and c rules.
2. The second subpath is induced only by instances of the rule.
3. The third subpath is induced only by instances of the , , , , , ,
and rules.
Note that for quasi-canonical proofs we have that the pragmatic area of occurrences of the
and c rules is empty. Furthermore, for proofs in ILP we have that in the same branch
there can never be an instance of the c and an instance of the c rule.
DEFINITION 2.4 (canonical proof)
We say that a proof in quasi-canonical form is in canonical form if in every path from the
leaves to the root all the instances of the and c rules occur before the instances of the
c rule or the instance of the c rule.
It is easy to see that every cut-free proof in ILP can be transformed in a proof in quasi-
canonical form by permuting the order of the rules. We can also show that every proof in
quasi-canonical form can be transformed in a proof in canonical form by permuting the order
of the rules. As a consequence we have the following
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1. always
2. 1 if and only if
3. if and only if
4. if and only if and
5. if and only if or
6. if and only if or
7. if and only if for all such that
8. if and only if for all such that
9. if and only if there exists such that ,
and
10. if and only if
(a) for all such that
(b) for all such that
11. if and only if
12. if and only if there exists such that ,
and
13. if and only if
(a) for all such that
(b) for all such that
FIGURE 3. The forcing relation for extended radical formulas
LEMMA 2.5
A sequent is provable without cuts in ILP if and only if there exists a proof of it in
canonical form.
3 Kripke-style semantics
3.1 Kripke models
We use the modal interpretation of sentential formulas given in Section 2.1 and give a Kripke-
style semantic to the extended radical part of the extended pragmatic language which
combines and extends the Kripke semantics of modal [12, 3] and relevant logic [17].
DEFINITION 3.1 (Kripke model)
A Kripke frame is a quadruple such that the following properties are
satisfied.
1. is a preordered commutative and idempotent monoid.
2. is a is a commutative and idempotent semigroup.
3. The operation and the relation are such that
(a) for all there exists such that ;
(b) for all and such that and we have that ;
(c) for all and such that there exists such that
, and ;
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(d) for all and such that there exists such that
and .
A Kripke frame is finite if both sets and are finite. A Kripke model is a pair
where is the forcing relation for atomic formulas. The forcing relation is
defined inductively for extended radical formulas by the clauses given in Figure 3. A Kripke
model is finite if its Kripke frame is finite.
is called the set of possible worlds and the set of ‘virtuous’ worlds. Note that the
monoidal operation of is increasing, i.e. for all , if
and then . Furthermore, note that a semigroup (monoid) with a
commutative and idempotent operation is a semilattice. In particular we have that the preorder
on the monoid is the one induced by the semilattice operation , i.e. if and
only if . Anyway, we prefer to keep the notation of the above definition in order
to distinguish between the semantics of relevant and of modal logic.
Suppose that a formula is obtained by the extended modal interpretation of sentential
formulas. By induction on the complexity of the formula we can show that the property of
Krikpe monotonicity holds.
LEMMA 3.2
For all , if and then .
Furthermore, as an immediate consequence of property (3b) of the definition of Kripke
model we have the following
LEMMA 3.3
For all , if and only if .
3.2 Validity and soundness
Suppose that and . Let and denote and
1, respectively. A sequent can then be seen as
i.e. the semicolon and the commas in the relevant area are interpreted as tensor products,
whereas the commas in the pragmatic area are interpreted as classical conjunctions.
DEFINITION 3.4 (validity)
A sequent is valid if for all Kripke models and for all , such that
, we have that . If the sequent is valid then we write
.
THEOREM 3.5 (soundness)
If a sequent is provable in ILP then .
PROOF. The proof is by induction on the structure of the proofs of ILP.
1. If the proof consists of a logical axiom , then the property follows from the fact that
by the definition of forcing there exists , such that , 1 and
, and from the fact that .
2. Suppose that the last rule of the proof is a rule. The induction hypothesis is that
(a) for all , such that , we have that ,
(b) for all , such that , we have that .
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We have to show that for all , such that , it holds that
.
By the definition of forcing there exists such that ,
, and . By the idempotence of the monoidal operation
. Thus by the definition of forcing
and . By the first clause of the induction hypothesis .
Thus by the second clause of the induction hypothesis .
3. Suppose that the last rule of the proof is a rule. The induction hypothesis is that for all
, such that , we have that . We have to show that
for all , such that , it holds that .
By the definition of forcing there exists such that ,
and . By the definition of forcing and and by the
idempotence of the monoidal operation . Thus by the induction
hypothesis .
4. Suppose that the last rule of the proof is a c rule. The induction hypothesis is that for
all , such that 1, we have that . We have to show that
for all , such that 1, it holds that .
Suppose that is such that . By the definition of forcing
1. By the induction hypothesis . Thus by the definition of
forcing .
5. Suppose that the last rule of the proof is a c rule. The induction hypothesis is that
(a) for all , such that 1, we have that ,
(b) for all , such that , we have that .
We have to show that for all , such that , it
holds that .
By the definition of forcing there exists such that ,
, and . By the definition of Kripke model
and thus by the definition of forcing 1. By the first clause of the
induction hypothesis and by the definition of forcing . Thus by
the second clause of the induction hypothesis .
6. Suppose that the last rule of the proof is a c rule. The induction hypothesis is that for
all , such that A Z 1, we have that . We have to show
that for all , such that A Z 1, it holds that .
By the definition of forcing there exists such that , A
and Z 1. By the induction hypothesis and by the definition of forcing
A .
By the definition of forcing there exists such that and
. Suppose that . By the definition of forcing
, i.e. , for every such that . Thus by the definition of
forcing A . Furthermore, by the property (3c) of the definition of Kripke
model every , such that , is of the form .
By the definition of forcing . By the property (3d) of the definition
of Kripke model, every such that is of the form and
thus , i.e. . Thus by the definition of forcing .
The other cases are similiar and left to the reader.
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4 Completeness
4.1 Proof-search procedure
The following remarks are an immediate consequence of the properties of the sequent calcu-
lus ILP given in Section 2.2.
1. If the left premiss of the c rule is an instance of the logical axiom then we never
need to split the context when we consider a c rule in the proof-search procedure.
2. If we deal only with proofs in quasi-canonical form then we can consider the sequent
calculus ILP as an intuitionistic sequent calculus where the atomic formulas are of the
form or . Thus we can apply one of the well-known proof-search procedures for
intuitionistic propositional logic and need only to consider its extension to the relevant
case. Note that we can absorb the structural rules in the pragmatic area of ILP in order to
obtain a sequent calculus with the same properties as G3i [16] for which we have imme-
diately a proof-search procedure because the rules can be read bottom-up. Furthermore
we can use the technique described in [7] to make the proof-search procedure loop-free.
3. If we deal only with proofs in canonical form then the proof-search procedure for the
extension to the relevant case is determined by the order in which the rules are applied in
the ILP-proof.
Following these guidelines we describe a proof-search procedure which determines whether
there exists a proof in canonical form. As explained above we can apply a terminating proof-
search procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic which works only in the pragmatic area
and in the succedent of the sequent. If this procedure fails in finding a proof then we are left
with a certain number of sequents which occur at the leaves of the search tree and
which are not of the form or or . We call the sequents at
the leaves initial sequents of the extension to the relevant case. Note that in an initial sequent
is of the form or . We can now apply to every initial sequent the following
procedure which determines if it is provable or not.
We denote with the multiset from which we have deleted all formulas with prag-
matic connectives and consider the set of all multisets (including the empty one) of
formulas contained in . Because we don’t know which formulas should be introduced in
the pragmatic area by the permeability rule in order to achieve provability, we consider the
sequents for each . If at least one of these sequents is provable
then the initial sequent is provable. Note that if a sequent is provable with respect to a certain
multiset then the formulas which occur in but not in can be introduced in the prag-
matic area by the weakening rule . Furthermore, we use the square brackets to collect the
analysed formulas in order to detect hidden contraction rules (see steps (PS2.c) and (PS2.d)
and Example 4.1 below).
PS1.(a) If the sequent is of the form c then we consider the sequent
and repeat this step until is of the form .
(b) If the sequent is of the form A Z then we consider the sequent
A Z . If A or Z is empty, then we don’t apply the rule and stop the
construction of the search tree for this sequent.
PS2. We construct now a search tree starting from the sequent obtained by step (PS1). Sup-
pose that after a certain number of steps in the construction the search tree has se-
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c
c
c
c c
c
c c c
c c
c
c c c
c c c
FIGURE 4. Example of a canonical proof
quents of the form as leaves. For every leaf we can extend the search
tree in the following way.
(a) If there is a sequent in the path from the leaf to the root such that
and 2 then we have a loop and we don’t consider this leaf
of the search tree anymore.
(b) Otherwise, if two formulas and c occur in then we denote with
the multiset from which we have deleted c and and add the sequent
c as a new leaf to the search tree.
(c) Otherwise, if a formula c occurs in and a formula occurs in then
we denote with the multiset from which we have deleted c and add the
sequent c as a new leaf to the search tree.
(d) Otherwise, if a formula occurs in and formulas c
occur in then we denote with the multiset from which we have deleted
and add the sequents as new leaves to the search tree. If at
least one of these sequents is provable then the initial sequent is provable.
(e) Otherwise, if no one of the cases above is applicable to the leaf then we don’t consider
this leaf of the search tree anymore.
If we reach a leaf of the form or then the initial sequent
is provable and we stop the proof-search for this initial sequent.
EXAMPLE 4.1
Consider the sequent
c c c
which can be obtained by the proof given in Figure 4. Note that the final sequent is obtained
by two occurrences of the contraction rule . Suppose that c c
c . Because the pragmatic area is empty we need only to apply the proof-
search procedure to the sequent c c c . From
the procedure we obtain the following complete search tree where the left branch determines
that the sequent is provable, whereas in the right branch we have a loop. Note that the number
2 denotes the multiset regarded as set, i.e. occurs in .
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of occurrences of step (PS2.c) and of step (PS2.d) in the left branch coincides exactly with
the number of occurrences of the contraction rule in the proof. The use of square brackets
permits one to determine contractions but it is also the source of looping.
PS2.a
c c
PS2.c
c c
PS2.d
c c c c
PS2.b
c c c c
PS2.c
c c c c
PS2.b
c c c
EXAMPLE 4.2
Consider the following sequent which is not provable in ILP.
c c
In order to show that the sequent is not provable we have to consider two cases, i.e. we have
to show that neither c nor c is
provable. In the first case we have to consider the initial sequent c
and to apply the extension of the proof-search procedure to the sequents c
and c , but the procedure terminates after step (PS1.a) in both
cases. In the second case we have to consider the initial sequent c
and to apply the extension of the proof-search procedure to the sequents
and c , but the procedure terminates immediately and after step
(PS1.b), respectively.
The procedure for the initial sequents explained above considers all possible cases. Thus
we are able to decide if an initial sequent is provable or not. We can show by induction on
the cardinality of the multiset that the procedure is also terminating. The crucial step
in the proof is that if the cardinality of doesn’t decrease, i.e. for some constant ,
then after a certain number of steps there will be a loop because there is only a finite number
of subformulas of formulas in and in and the procedure continues to analyse the same
formulas.
So we can use the information obtained by the procedure for the initial sequents of the
extension to the relevant case in the proof-search procedure for propositional intuitionistic
logic. By the decidability of propositional intuitionistic logic [4] we have the following
THEOREM 4.3 (decidability)
To determine whether there exists a proof in canonical form of a sequent is decid-
able.
4.2 Counter-models
If the proof-search procedure explained in the previous section determines that there is no
proof in canonical form of the sequent then we can construct a counter-model for
this sequent. The following facts explain the basic ideas and semantical motivations which
occur in the construction of the counter-model.
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F1. In order to refute we need a possible world such that and
different possible worlds such that for each formula in the multiset . It
follows that by the reflexivity of the accessibility relation
. In order to ensure that we need different possible worlds
such that for each formula added to the relevant area by step (PS1.a)
of the extension of the proof-search procedure. Otherwise it could happen that causal
implications in are satisfied vacuously.
F2. Each possible world of the counter-model which forces a formula comprising for-
mulas occuring in the pragmatic area has to be such that , where is the identity of
the preordered monoid, because 1 is a subformula of .
F3. If we consider the right implication rule of intuitionistic propositional logic
then the following property holds: if a possible world refutes then each
possible world refutes . In order to have that the same holds
for the rule
of ILP we have to impose the following condition: if the possible worlds and are
such that , and then . Thus each possible world
refutes .
F4. Consider the preliminary step of the extension of the proof-search procedure which can
be expressed by the following compact notation.
Note that the multiset is shifted from the pragmatic to the relevant area, thus
there exists a possible world such that and for each
. Therefore can equally be interpreted3 as 1 1 or as
1. Suppose that the possible worlds and are such that and
, respectively. We have that refutes if and only if
refutes .
F5. Consider step (PS1.a) of the extension of the proof-search procedure.
c
Suppose that the possible worlds and are such that and , re-
spectively. We have that refutes if and only if refutes
c .
3In a system like Girard’s LU [10] where sequents have mixed linear and intuitionistic contexts the permeability
rule is based upon the fundamental principle of linear logic . In sequents with relevant and
intuitionistic contexts where the contraction rule is available everywhere it suffices to have 1 1
1 .
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F6. Consider step (PS1.b) of the extension of the proof-search procedure.
A Z
A Z
Suppose that for each virtuous world such that it holds that A and that
the possible world is such that Z . We have that refutes A Z
if and only if refutes A Z .
F7. Consider step (PS2.b) of the extension of the proof-search procedure.
c
c
Note that there exists possible worlds and such that , c
and . Suppose that . We have that refutes
if and only if refutes c . The same argument
applies also to step (PS2.c) and (PS2.d).
Starting from these facts we construct now a finite Kripke frame and define then a forcing
relation such that we obtain a finite counter-model of the sequent .
KF1. Suppose that we have a set of possible worlds together with an accessibility rela-
tion obtained from the proof-search procedure for intuitionistic propo-
sitional logic by the usual way. We know that intuitionistic propositional logic satisfies
the finite model property [4], thus we suppose that is finite. Let denote the root
of the intuitionistic refutation tree.
We define the set of possible worlds of the Kripke frame as and extend
the accessibility relation on with and its reflexive and transitive closure
to an accessibility relation on . Furthermore, we endow the preordered set with
an idempotent and commutative operation and extend it to a monoid : if
then .
DEFINITION 4.4
If and then we extend the accessibility relation with ,
and its reflexive and transitive closure. Furthermore, if and
then we extend with and its reflexive and transitive closure.
Note that as an immediate consequence of this definition we have that is
a preordered monoid. Furthermore, there exists an equivalence relation between the
elements of the preordered monoid. Thus they can be divided into equivalence classes.
LEMMA 4.5
If then .
PROOF. It follows from and that by Definition 4.4. Similarly we
have that and imply by Definition 4.4 and idempotence.
KF2. We consider the set of possible worlds of fact F1,
endow it with an idempotent and commutative operation and extend it to a semigroup
: if then .
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We consider the set where
we impose that and for each and . Let
denote . Note that is a commutative and idempotent monoid.
DEFINITION 4.6
For each possible world such that and we extend the accessibility
relation with and its reflexive and transitive closure. Furthermore, if
, and then we extend with and
its reflexive and transitive closure.
Note, in particular, that the equivalence relation on extends to an equivalence rela-
tion on . Furthermore, as an immediate consequence of this definition we have that
is a preordered monoid.
KF3. We define the set of virtuous worlds and the relation in the following
way: for each we add exactly one virtuous world such that to .
Furthermore, for each such that we impose that . We endow
the set with an idempotent and commutative operation and extend it to a semigroup
: if then .
DEFINITION 4.7
If , and then .
As an immediate consequence of this definition it holds that implies .
DEFINITION 4.8
We define an operation in the following way. If and then
. Furthermore, if , , and then .
Note that as a consequence of these definitions we have that the properties (3a), (3b),
(3c) and (3d) of the definition of Kripke model are satisfied.
LEMMA 4.9
Every finitely generated commutative semigroup with an idempotent operation is fi-
nite.
PROOF. By commutativity and idempotence every element of has the form
where are generators.
LEMMA 4.10
The preordered monoid , the semigroup , the operation
and the relation defined above form a Kripke frame .
Furthermore, the Kripke frame is finite.
PROOF. That is a Kripke frame follows from the above definitions. and are
finitely generated. Thus they are finite by Lemma 4.9.
EXAMPLE 4.11
Let us consider the following refutation tree obtained from the intuitionistic proof-search
procedure applied to the sequent of Example 4.2.
!! ""
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#######
$$$$$$$$$
%%%%%
%%%%%
&&&&&&&&&&
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((((((
&&&&&&&&&&
''''''''''''
)))))))
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------
------
...........
/////////////
FIGURE 5. Example of a Kripke frame
From the extension of the proof-search procedure to the relevant case we know that we have
to consider also the sets of possible worlds and . Figure 5 shows the Kripke frame ob-
tained from these possible worlds and the accessibility relation of the intuitionistic refutation
tree. Note that the nodes of the Kripke frame are equivalence classes of possible or virtuous
worlds. In particular the following properties hold. Suppose that the possible world is such
that and and that and . If then by
Definition 4.7. Furthermore, note that , and by
Definition 4.8. Thus by Definition 4.7.
Before we define the forcing relation for atomic formulas we associate to each possible
world and to each virtuous world a set of formulas of the form 1, and
and a set of formulas of the form , respectively.
DEFINITION 4.12
is defined inductively by the following clauses.
1. Suppose that is a possible world of the counter-model obtained from the
proof-search procedure for intuitionistic propositional logic. is the set of formulas of
the form and which interpretations and , respectively, are forced at by
the intuitionistic forcing relation. Furthermore, we have that 1 .
2. For each possible world of fact F1 we have that where is
of the form or .
3. For each possible world of fact F1 we have that .
4. If the formula is of the form 1, or and the possible worlds are such
that and then we set to .
5. If then for each virtuous world such that , we set to .
6. If c then for each possible world such that and for each
virtuous world such that , we set to and to ,
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respectively.
7. If c then for each possible world such that and for each virtuous
world such that , we set to and to ,
respectively.
The set of formulas and associated to each possible world and to each virtuous
world , respectively, permits one to define the forcing relation for atomic
formulas. Note, in particular, that without it wouldn’t be possible to determine which
atomic formulas must be forced in order to obtain a counter-model because it could happen
that the decision procedure doesn’t analyse all formulas of the form and (see Example
4.2).
DEFINITION 4.13
For each possible world and each virtuous world , if or
then or , respectively.
As an immediate consequence of the clauses of the forcing relation for extended radical
formulas given in Figure 3 and of the facts F1, . . . , F7 given at the beginning of this section
we have the following
LEMMA 4.14
, but .
EXAMPLE 4.15
We complete the Examples 4.2 and 4.11 with the definition of the forcing relation for atomic
formulas and show that this model refutes
1
The base cases of the defintion of are the following: , ,
c , 1 , and . If we apply the inductive clauses
of Definition 4.12 then we obtain the following table for possible worlds
1
1
1
1 c
1 c
and the following table for virtuous worlds
By Definition 4.13 it follows that the atomic formula is forced at the worlds , ,
, , , and and that the atomic formula at the worlds ,
, , , , and .
For each such that it holds that . Thus by the definition of forcing
and by Lemma 3.3. From it follows that 1 and therefore that
1 by the definition of forcing.
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For each such that it holds that . Thus by the definition of
forcing and by Lemma 3.3. From for each such that and
from it follows that and , respectively, by the definition
of forcing. Thus and by the definition
of forcing. From it follows that by the
definition of forcing.
For each such that it holds that and . Thus
and by the definition of forcing. Note that by idempotence and
thus by the definition of forcing. From and it
follows that by the definition of forcing and by Lemma 3.3. Thus
by the definition of forcing. From it follows that
by the definition of forcing.
Thus by the definition
of forcing.
As an immediate consequence of Lemmas 4.10 and 4.14 we have the following
THEOREM 4.16 (finite model property)
If there doesn’t exist a proof in canonical form of the sequent then it has a finite
counter-model.
4.3 Completeness and cut elimination
THEOREM 4.17 (completeness)
The sequent is provable in ILP if and only if .
PROOF. Suppose that and that the decision procedure determines that the sequent
is not provable in ILP. Then we can construct a counter-model as explained above
which contradicts the hypothesis that is valid. The other direction holds by the
soundness theorem.
Remember that proofs in canonical form are cut-free proofs. Thus as a consequence of
the fact that the proof-search procedure determines whether there exists a proof in canonical
form and the fact that the cut rules are sound with respect to the given Kripke-style semantics
we obtain an alternative proof (which doesn’t provide a procedure to transform proofs with
cuts in cut-free proofs) of cut elimination with respect to the one given in [2].
THEOREM 4.18 (cut elimination)
If a sequent is provable in ILP then it is provable without cuts.
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